We introduce a new approach to dealing with the well-known logical omniscience problem in epistemic logic. Instead of taking possible worlds where each world is a model of classical propositional logic, we take possible worlds which are models of a nonstandard propositional logic we call NPL, which is somewhat related to relevance logic. This approach gives new insights into the logic of implicit and explicit belief considered by Levesque and Lakemeyer. In particular, we show that in a precise sense agents in the structures considered by Levesque and Lakemeyer are perfect reasoners in NPL.
Introduction
The standard approach to modelling knowledge, which goes back to Hintikka Hin62] , is in terms of possible worlds. In this approach, an agent is said to know a fact ' if ' is true in all the worlds he considers possible. As has been frequently pointed out, this approach su ers from what Hintikka termed the logical omniscience problem Hin75]: agents are so intelligent that they know all the logical consequences of their knowledge. Thus, if an agent knows all of the formulas in a set and if logically implies the formula ', then the agent also knows '. In particular, they know all valid formulas (including all tautologies of standard propositional logic). Furthermore, the knowledge of an agent is closed under implication: if the agent knows ' and knows ' ) , then the agent also knows . The reader should note that closure under implication is a special case of logical omniscience only if f'; ' ) g logically implies ; although this logical implication holds in standard propositional logic, it does not hold in our nonstandard propositional logic NPL that we shall introduce later.
While logical omniscience is not a problem under some conditions (this is true in particular for interpretations of knowledge that are often appropriate for analyzing distributed systems Hal87] and certain AI systems RK86]), it is certainly not appropriate to the extent that we want to model resource-bounded agents. A number of di erent semantics for knowledge have been proposed to get around this problem. The one most relevant to our discussion here is what has been called the impossible-worlds approach. In this approach, the standard possible worlds are augmented by \impossible worlds" (or, perhaps better, nonstandard worlds), where the customary rules of logic do not hold Cre72, Cre73, Lev84, Ran82, Wan90] . It is still the case that an agent knows a fact ' if ' is true in all the worlds the agent considers possible, but since the agent may in fact consider some nonstandard worlds possible, this will a ect what he knows.
What about logical omniscience? Although notions like \validity" and \logical consequence" (which played a prominent part in our informal description of logical omniscience) may seem absolute, they are not; their formal de nitions depend on how truth is de ned and on the class of worlds being considered. Although there are nonstandard worlds in the impossible-worlds approach, validity and logical consequence are taken with respect to only the standard worlds, where all the rules of standard logic hold. For example, a formula is valid exactly if it is true in all the standard worlds in every structure. The intuition here is that the nonstandard worlds serve only as epistemic alternatives; although an agent may be muddled and may consider a nonstandard world possible, we (the logicians who get to examine the situation from the outside) know that the \real world" must obey the laws of standard logic. If we consider validity and logical implication with respect to standard worlds, then it is easy to show that logical omniscience fails in \impossible-worlds" structures: an agent does not know all valid formulas, nor does he know all the logical consequences of his knowledge here (since, in deciding what the agent knows, we must take the nonstandard worlds into account).
In this paper we consider an approach which, while somewhat related to the impossible-worlds approach, stems from a di erent philosophy. We consider the implications of basing a logic of knowledge on a nonstandard logic rather than on standard propositional logic. The basic motivation is the observation, implicit in Lev84] and commented on in FH88, Var86] , that if we weaken the \logical" in \logical omniscience", then perhaps we can diminish the acuteness of the logical omniscience problem. Thus, instead of distinguishing between standard and nonstandard worlds, we take all our worlds to be models of a nonstandard logic. Some worlds in a structure may indeed be models of standard logic, but they do not have any special status for us. We consider all worlds when de ning validity and logical consequence; we accept the commitment to nonstandard logic. Knowledge is still de ned to be truth in all worlds the agent considers possible. It thus turns out that we still have the logical omniscience problem, but this time with respect to nonstandard logic. The hope is that the logical omniscience problem can be alleviated by appropriately choosing the nonstandard logic. There are numerous well-known nonstandard propositional logics, including intuitionistic propositional logic Hey56], relevance logic AB75], and the 4-valued logic in Bel77a, Bel77b, Dun76] . We shall give our own approach in this paper, which is closely related to relevance logic and to 4-valued logic. For each of these nonstandard logics, the starting point is the observation that there are a number of properties of implication in standard logic that seem inappropriate in certain contexts. In particular, consider a formula such as (p^:p) ) q. In standard logic this is valid; that is, from a contradiction one can deduce anything. However, consider a knowledge base into which users enter data from time to time. As Belnap points out Bel77b], it is almost certainly the case that in a large knowledge base, there will be some inconsistencies. One can imagine that at some point a user entered the fact that Bob's salary is $50,000, while at another point, perhaps a di erent user entered the fact that Bob's salary is $60,000. Thus, in standard logic anything can be inferred from this contradiction. One solution to this problem is to replace standard worlds by worlds (called situations in Lev84, Lak87] , and set-ups in RR72, Bel77b] ) in which it is possible that a primitive proposition p is true, false, both true and false, or neither true and false. We achieve the same e ect here by keeping our worlds seemingly standard and by using a device introduced in RR72, RM73] to decouple the semantics of a formula and its negation: for every world s there is a related world s . A formula :' is true in s i ' is not true in s . It is thus possible for both ' and :' to be true at s, and for neither to be true. (The standard worlds are now the ones where s = s ; all the laws of standard propositional logic do indeed hold in such worlds. ) We call the propositional logic that results from the above semantics nonstandard propositional logic (NPL). Unlike standard logic, for which ' logically implies exactly when ' ) is valid, where ' ) is de ned as :' _ , this is not the case in NPL. This leads us to include a connective , ! (\strong implication") in NPL so that, among other things, we have that ' logically implies i ' , ! is valid. Of course, , ! agrees with ) on the standard worlds, but in general it is di erent. Given our nonstandard semantics, ' , ! comes closer than ' ) to capturing the idea that \if ' is true, then is true." Just as in relevance logic, formulas such as (p^:p) , ! q are not valid, so that from a contradiction, one cannot conclude everything. In fact, we can show that if ' and are standard propositional formulas (those formed from : and^, containing no occurrences of , !), then ' , ! is valid exactly if ' entails in the relevance logic R RR72, RM73] . In formulas with nested occurrences of , !, however, the semantics of , ! is quite di erent from the relevance logic notion of entailment.
We are most interested in applying our nonstandard semantics to knowledge. It turns out that although agents in our logic are not perfect reasoners as far as standard logic goes, they are perfect reasoners in nonstandard logic. In particular, as we show, the complete axiomatization for the standard possible-worlds interpretation of knowledge can be converted to a complete axiomatization for the nonstandard possible-world interpretation of knowledge essentially by replacing the inference rules for standard propositional logic by inference rules for NPL. We need, however, to use , ! rather ) in formulating the axioms of knowledge. Thus, the distribution axiom, valid in the standard possible-worlds interpretation, says (K i '^K i (' ) )) ) K i . This says that an agent's knowledge is closed under logical consequence: if the agent knows ' and knows that ' implies , then he also knows . The analogue for this axiom holds in our nonstandard interpretation, once we replace ) by , !. This is appropriate since it is , ! that captures the intuitive notion of implication in our framework. The other basic property of knowledge (knowledge generalization) remains unchanged: if ' is valid, then so is K i '. That is, the agents know every valid formula (although the set of valid formulas are distinct for the standard logic and for our nonstandard logic). Thus, the basic properties of knowledge (closure under logical consequence, and knowledge of valid formulas) remain unchanged; in some sense, we have decoupled the properties of the underlying propositional logic, which change drastically, from the properties of knowledge, which remain essentially the same.
Our approach has an additional nice payo : we show that in a certain important application we can obtain a polynomial-time algorithm for reasoning about knowledge. By contrast, under the standard approach, the complexity of such reasoning in that application is co-NP-complete.
It is instructive to compare our approach with that of Levesque and Lakemeyer Lev84, Lak87] . Our semantics is essentially equivalent to theirs. But while they avoid logical omniscience by giving nonstandard worlds a secondary status and de ning validity only with respect to standard worlds, we accept logical omniscience, albeit with respect to nonstandard logic. Thus, our results justify and elaborate a remark made in FH88, Var86] that agents in Levesque's model are perfect reasoners in relevance logic.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our nonstandard propositional logic, and investigate some of its properties. In Section 3, we review the standard possible-worlds approach. In Section 4, we give our nonstandard approach to possible worlds. In Section 5, we add strong implication (the propositional connective , !) to our syntax, and thereby obtain our full nonstandard propositional logic NPL. In Section 6, we give a sound and complete axiomatization for NPL, and give a sound and complete axiomatization for the logic of knowledge using NPL as a basis rather than classical propositional logic. We also show that the validity problem for NPL is co-NP-complete, just as for standard propositional logic, and the validity problem for our nonstandard logic of knowledge is PSPACE-complete, just as for the standard logic of knowledge. In Section 7, we give the payo we promised, of a polynomial-time algorithm for querying a knowledge base in certain natural cases. We relate our results to those in the impossible-worlds approach in Section 8. Levesque and Lakemeyer's formalism is compared with ours in Section 9. We give our conclusions in Section 10.
A Nonstandard Propositional Logic
Although by now it is fairly well entrenched, standard propositional logic has several undesirable and counterintuitive properties. When we are rst introduced to propositional logic in school, we are perhaps somewhat uncomfortable when we learn that \' ) " is taken to be simply an abbreviation for :' _ . Why should the fact that either :' is true or is true correspond to \if ' is true then is true"?
Another problem with standard propositional logic is that it is fragile: a false statement implies everything. For example, the formula (p^:p) ) q is valid, even if p and q are unrelated. As we observed in the introduction, one situation where this could be a serious problem occurs when we have a large knowledge base of many facts, obtained from multiple sources, and where a theorem prover is used to derive various conclusions from this knowledge base.
To deal with these problems, many alternatives to standard propositional logic have been proposed. We focus on one particular alternative here, and consider its consequences.
The idea is to allow formulas ' and :' to have \independent" truth values. Thus, rather than requiring that :' be true i ' is not true, we wish instead to allow the possibility that :' can be either true or false, regardless of whether ' is true or false.
Intuitively, the truth of formulas can be thought of as being determined by some knowledge base. We can think of ' being true as meaning that the fact ' has been put into a knowledge base of true formulas, and we can think of :' being true as meaning that the fact ' has been put into a knowledge base of false formulas. Since it is possible for ' to have been put in both knowledge bases, it is possible for both ' and :' to be true. Similarly, if ' had not been put into either knowledge base, then neither ' nor :' would be true.
There are several ways to capture this intuition formally (see Dun86] We de ne the formulas of the propositional logic by starting with a set of primitive propositions that describe basic facts about the domain of discourse, and forming more complicated formulas by closing o under the Boolean connectives : and^. Thus, if ' and are formulas, then so are :' and '^ . When we deal only with propositional formulas, we can identify a world with a classical truth assignment to the primitive propositions, and we can decide the truth of a propositional formula at a world s by considering only s and s . Thus, we de ne an NPL structure to consist of an ordered pair (s; t) of classical truth assignments to the set of primitive propositions. We take to be a function that maps a truth assignment in an NPL structure to the other truth assignment in that structure. Thus, if S = (s; t), then s = t and t = s. Truth is de ned relative to a pair (S; u), where S is an NPL structure and u is one of the truth assignments in S. We de ne :' to be true at (S; u) if ' is not true at u ; thus, we use the other truth assignment in order to de ne negation. More formally, given an NPL structure S = (s; t), and u 2 fs; tg, we de ne the semantics as follows: (S; u) j = p i u(p) = true for a primitive proposition p (S; u) j = '^ i (S; u) j = ' and (S; u) j = (S; u) j = :' i (S; u ) 6 j = ' We call the logic de ned so far NPL ? . Later, we shall add strong implication (, !) to get NPL.
Note that if S = (s; s) for some truth assignment s (that is, s = s ), then (S; s) j = :' i (S; s) 6 j = '. Hence, in this case, for every propositional formula ', we have that (S; s) j = ' precisely if ' is true under the truth assignment s, and so we are back to standard propositional logic. Note also that in the general case, it is possible for neither ' nor :' to be true at u (if (S; u) 6 j = ' and (S; u ) j = ') and for both ' and :' to be true at u (if (S; u) j = ' and (S; u ) 6 j = ').
This approach is equivalent to Belnap's 4-valued logic Bel77a, Bel77b] , in which he has four truth values: True, False, Both, and None. Belnap We prove only (1) and (2) , since the proofs of the rest are similar.
(S; u) j = ::' i (S; u ) 6 j = :' i (S; u ) j = ' i (S; u) j = ':
As for (2), (S; u) j = ' 1 _ ' 2 i (S; u) j = :(:' 1^: ' 2 ) i (S; u ) 6 j = :' 1^: ' 2 i (S; u ) 6 j = :' 1 or (S; u ) 6 j = :' 2 i (S; u ) j = ' 1 or (S; u ) j = ' 2 i (S; u) j = ' 1 or (S; u) j = ' 2 : In contrast to the behavior of :,^, and _, the connective ) behaves rather peculiarly, since (S; u) j = ' 1 ) ' 2 holds precisely when (S; u ) j = ' 1 implies that (S; u) j = ' 2 . We will come back to the issue of the de nition of implication later.
Validity and logical implication are de ned in the usual way: ' is valid if it holds at every (S; u), and ' logically implies if (S; u) j = ' implies (S; u) j = for every (S; u). What Thus, the validity problem is very easy: the answer is always \No, the formula is not valid!" Thus, the notion of validity is trivially uninteresting here. In contrast, there are many nontrivial logical implications; for example, as we see from Proposition 2.1, ::' logically implies ', and :(' 1^'2 ) logically implies :' 1 _ :' 2 .
The reader may be puzzled why Proposition 2.1 does not provide us some tautologies.
For example, Proposition 2.1 tells us that ::' logically implies '. Doesn't this mean that ::' ) ' is a tautology? This does not follow. In classical propositional logic, ' logically implies i the formula ' ) is valid. This is not the case in NPL. For example, ' logically implies ', yet ' ) ' (i.e., :'_') is not valid in NPL. In Section 5, we de ne a new connective that allows us to express logical implication in the language, just as ) does for classical logic. We close this section by characterizing the complexity of deciding logical implication in NPL ? . Theorem 2.3: The logical implication problem in NPL ? is co-NP-complete.
The proof of this theorem will appear in Section 8, when we have developed some more machinery. This theorem says that logical implication in NPL ? is as hard as logical implication in standard propositional logic, that is, co-NP-complete. We shall see in Theorem 4.3 that a similar phenomenon takes place for knowledge formulas.
Standard Possible Worlds
We review in this section the standard possible-worlds approach to knowledge. The intuitive idea behind the possible-worlds model is that besides the true state of a airs, there are a number of other possible states of a airs or \worlds". Given his current information, an agent may not be able to tell which of a number of possible worlds describes the actual state of a airs. An agent is then said to know a fact ' if ' is true at all the worlds he considers possible (given his current information).
The To get a sound and complete axiomatization, one starts with propositional reasoning and adds to it axioms and inference rules for knowledge. By propositional reasoning we mean all substitution instances of sound propositional inference rules of propositional logic. An inference rule is a statement of the form \from infer ", where f g is a set of formulas. (See FHV92] for a discussion of inference rules.) Such an inference rule is sound if for every substitution of formulas ' 1 ; : : : ; ' k for the primitive propositions p 1 ; : : : ; p k in and , if all the formulas in ] are valid, then ] is also valid. Modus ponens (\from ' and ' ) infer ") is an example of a sound propositional inference rule. Of course, if is a valid propositional formula, then \from ; infer " is a sound propositional inference rule. It is easy to show that \from infer " is a sound propositional inference rule i is a propositional consequence of FHV92], which explains why the notion of inference is often confused with the notion of consequence. As we shall see later, the two notions do not coincide in our nonstandard propositional logic NPL.
Consider the following axiom system K, which in addition to propositional reasoning consists of one axiom and one rule of inference given below:
PR. All sound inference rules of propositional logic
One should view the axioms and inference rules above as schemes, i.e., K actually consists of all L-instances of the above axioms and inference rules. Theorem 3.1: Che80] K is a sound and complete axiomatization for validity of Lformulas in M.
We note that PR can be replaced by any complete axiomatization of standard propositional logic that includes modus ponens as an inference rule, which is the usual way that K is presented (cf. Che80]). We chose to present K in this unusual way in anticipation of our treatment of NPL in Section 5.
Finally, instead of trying to prove validity, one may wish to check validity algorithmically. 
Nonstandard Possible Worlds
Our main goal in this paper is to help alleviate logical omniscience by de ning Kripke structures that are based on a nonstandard propositional logic, rather than basing them on classical propositional logic. We shall base our nonstandard Kripke structures on our nonstandard propositional logic; in particular, we make use of the operator of Routley and Meter RR72, RM73].
A nonstandard Kripke structure is a tuple (S; ; K 1 ; :::; K n ; ), where (S; ; K 1 ; :::; K n ) is a (Kripke) structure, and where is a unary function with domain and range the set S of worlds (where we write s for the result of applying the function to the world s) such that s = s for each s 2 S. We refer to nonstandard Kripke structures as nonstandard structures. We call them nonstandard, since we think of a world where ' and :' are both true or both false as nonstandard. We denote the class of nonstandard structures for n agents over by NM n . As before, when n and are not relevant to our discussion, we write NM instead of NM n .
The de nition of j = for the language L for nonstandard structures is the same as for standard structures, except for the clause for negation:
In particular, the clause for K i does not change at all:
Our semantics is closely related to that of Levesque Lev84] and Lakemeyer Lak87]. We discuss their approach in Section 9. Unlike our approach, in their approach it is necessary to introduce two K i relations for each agent i, to deal separately with the truth of formulas of the form K i ' and the truth of formulas of the form :K i '.
Similarly to before, we say that ' is valid with respect to NM, and write NM j = ', if (M; s) j = ' for every nonstandard structure M and every state s of M.
As we noted earlier, it is possible for neither ' nor :' to be true at world s, and for both ' and :' to be true at world s. Let us refer to a world where neither ' nor :' is true as incomplete (with respect to '); otherwise, s is complete. The intuition behind an incomplete world is that there is not enough information to determine whether ' is true or whether :' is true. What about a world where both ' and :' are true? We call such a world incoherent (with respect to '); otherwise, s is coherent. The intuition behind an incoherent world is that it is overdetermined: it might correspond to a situation where several people have provided mutually inconsistent information. A world s is standard if s = s . Note that for a standard world, the de nition of the semantics of negation is equivalent to the standard de nition. In particular, a standard world s is both complete and coherent: for each formula ' exactly one of ' or :' is true at s. Remark 4.1: If we consider a xed structure, it is possible for a world to be both complete and coherent without being standard. Nevertheless, there is an important sense in which this can be viewed as \accidental", and that the only worlds that can be complete and coherent are those that are standard. To understand this, we must work at the level of frames Gol92, HC84] rather than structures. Essentially, a frame is a structure without the truth assignment . Thus, in our present context, we de ne a (nonstandard) frame F to be a tuple (S; K 1 ; : : :; K n ; ), where S is a set of worlds, K 1 ; : : : ; K n are binary relations on S, and is a unary function with domain and range the set S of worlds, such that s = s. We say that the nonstandard structure (S; ; K 1 ; : : : ; K n ; ) is based on the frame (S; K 1 ; : : :; K n ; ). We say that a world s is complete (resp. coherent) with respect to the frame F if s is complete (resp. coherent) with respect to every structure based on F; the world s is standard with respect to F exactly if s = s. It is now easy to see that if s is complete and coherent with respect to a frame F if and only if s is standard in F.
What are the properties of knowledge in nonstandard structures? One way to characterize the formal properties of a semantic model is to consider all the validities under that semantics. In our case, we should consider the formulas valid in NM. Theorem 2.2 tells us that no formula of NPL ? is valid. It turns out that even though we have enlarged the language to include knowledge modalities, it is still the case that no formula (of L) is valid. Even more, there is a single counterexample that simultaneously shows that no formula is valid! Theorem 4.2: There is no formula of L that is valid with respect to NM. In fact, there is a nonstandard structure M and a world s of M such that every formula of L is false at s, and a world t of M such that every formula of L is true at t. Proof: Let M = (S; ; K 1 ; :::; K n ; ) be a special nonstandard structure, de ned as follows. Let S contain only two worlds s and t, where t = s (and so s = t ). De ne by letting (s) be the truth assignment where (s)(p) = false for every primitive proposition p, and letting (t) be the truth assignment where (t)(p) = true for every primitive proposition p. De ne each K i to be f(s; s); (t; t)g. By a straightforward induction on formulas, it follows that for every formula ' of L, we have (M; s) 6 j = ' and (M; t) j = '. In particular, every formula of L is false at s, and every formula of L is true at t. Since every formula of L is false at s, no formula of L is valid with respect to NM.
It follows from Theorem 4.2 that we cannot use validities to characterize the properties of knowledge in nonstandard structures, since there are no validities! We will come back to this point later.
As we noted in the introduction, our basic motivation is the observation that if we weaken the \logical" in \logical omniscience", then perhaps we can diminish the acuteness of the logical omniscience problem. Logical implication is indeed weaker in nonstandard structures than in standard structures, as we now show. If ' logically implies in nonstandard structures, then ' logically implies in standard structures, since standard structures can be viewed as a special case of nonstandard structures. However, the converse is false, since, for example, f'; ' ) g logically implies in standard structures but not in nonstandard structures.
Nevertheless, logical omniscience did not go away! If an agent knows all of the formulas in a set , and if logically implies the formula ', then the agent also knows '. Because, as we just showed, we have weakened the notion of logical implication, the problem of logical omniscience is not as acute as it was in the standard approach. For example, knowledge of valid formulas, which is one form of omniscience, is completely innocuous here, since there are no valid formulas. Also, an agent's knowledge need not be closed under implication; an agent may know ' and ' ) without knowing , since, as we noted above, ' and ' ) do not logically imply with respect to nonstandard structures. We saw that the problem of determining validity is easy (since the answer is always \No"). Validity is a special case of logical implication: a formula is valid i it is a logical consequence of the empty set. Unfortunately, logical implication is not that easy to determine.
Theorem 4.3:
The logical implication problem for L-formulas in nonstandard structures is PSPACE-complete.
As with Theorem 2.3, the proof of this theorem will appear in Section 8, when we have developed some more machinery. Theorem 4.3 asserts that nonstandard logical implication for knowledge formulas (i.e., L-formulas) is as hard as standard logical implication for knowledge formulas, that is, PSPACE-complete. This is analogous to Theorem 2.3, where the same phenomenon takes place for propositional formulas. We saw in Theorem 4.2 that there are no valid formulas. In particular, we cannot capture properties of knowledge by considering all of the formulas that are valid, since there are none. By contrast, Theorem 4.3 tells us that the structure of logical implication is quite rich (since the logical implication problem is PSPACE-complete). In classical logic, we can capture logical implication in the language by using ): thus, ' logically implies precisely if the formula ' ) is valid. In the next section, we enrich our language by adding a new propositional connective , !, with which it is possible to express logical implication in the language.
Strong Implication
In Section 2 we introduced a nonstandard propositional logic, motivated by our discomfort with certain classic tautologies, such as (p^:p) ) q, and|lo and behold!|under this semantics these formulas are no longer valid. Unfortunately, the bad news is that other formulas, such as ' ) ' , that blatantly seem as if they should be valid, are not valid either under this approach. In fact, no formula is valid in the nonstandard approach! It seems that we have thrown out the baby with the bath water. In particular, we could not characterize the properties of knowledge in the nonstandard approach by considering validities, because there are no validities.
To get better insight into this problem, let us look more closely at why the formula ' ) ' is not valid. Our intuition about implication tells us that ' 1 ) ' 
In the pure propositional case, we refer to this logic as nonstandard propositional logic, or NPL. In the case of knowledge formulas, we denote by L ;, ! n , or L , ! for short, the set of formulas obtained by modifying the de nition of L n by adding , ! as a new propositional connective.
Strong implication is indeed a new connective, that is, it cannot be de ned using : and^. For, there are no valid formulas using only : and^, whereas by using , !, there are validities: ' , ! ' is an example, as is ' 1 , ! (' 1 _ ' 2 ).
The next proposition shows a sense in which strong implication is indeed stronger than implication. The converse is false, since the formula (p^:p) ) q is valid in standard propositional logic, whereas the formula (p^:p) , ! q is not valid in NPL.
As we promised earlier, we can now express logical implication in L , ! , using , !, just as we can express logical implication in standard structures, using ). With , !, we greatly increase the expressive power of our language. For example, in L (the language without , !), we cannot say that a formula ' is false. That is, there is no formula such that (M; t) j = i (M; t) 6 j = '. For suppose that there were such a formula . Let M and t be as in Theorem 4.2. Then (M; t) 6 j = and (M; t) 6 j = ', a contradiction. What about the formula :'? This formula says that :' is true, but does not say that ' is false. However, once we move to L , ! , it is possible to say that a formula is false, as we shall see in the next proposition. In order to state this and other results, it turns out to be convenient to have an abbreviation for the proposition false (which is false at every world). The way we abbreviate false depends on the context. When dealing with the standard semantics in the language L, we take true to be an abbreviation for some xed standard tautology such as p ) p. When dealing with the nonstandard semantics in the language L , ! , we take true to be an abbreviation for some xed nonstandard tautology such as p , ! p. In both cases, we abbreviate :true by false.
In fact, it will be convenient to think of true and false as constants in the language (rather than as abbreviations) with the obvious semantics. The next proposition, which shows how to say that a formula is false, is straightforward.
Proposition 5.3: Let M be a nonstandard structure, and let s be a world of M. Then (M; s) 6 j = ' i (M; s) j = ' , ! false.
This proposition enables us to embed standard propositional logic into NPL, by replacing :' by ' , ! false. We shall make use of this technique in the next section, when we give a sound and complete axiomatization for NPL, and analyze the complexity of the validity problem.
Axiomatizations and Complexity
In this section, we provide sound and complete axiomatizations for our nonstandard propositional logic NPL, and for our nonstandard epistemic logic, and prove their correctness. We also show that the validity problem for NPL is co-NP-complete, just as for standard propositional logic, and the validity problem for our nonstandard logic of knowledge is PSPACE-complete, just as for the standard logic of knowledge.
6.1 A sound and complete axiomatization for NPL
In this subsection we give an axiomatization for NPL and prove that it is sound and complete. We also show that the validity problem is co-NP-complete, just as for propositional logic, and discuss an interesting new inference rule. For the purposes of this subsection only, it is convenient to enrich our standard propositional language so that ) and false are rst-class objects, and not just abbreviations. In particular, it follows from Corollary 6.3 that the validity problem for NPL is at least as hard as that of propositional logic, namely, co-NP-complete. In fact, this is precisely the complexity.
Theorem 6.4: The validity problem for NPL formulas is co-NP-complete. Proof: The lower bound is immediate from Corollary 6.3. The upper bound follows from the fact that to determine if an NPL formula is not valid, we can simply guess an NPL structure S = (s; t) and u 2 fs; tg, and verify that (S; u) 6 j = .
Another connection between standard propositional logic and NPL is due to the fact that negated propositions in NPL behave in some sense as \independent" propositions.
We say that a formula ' Proof: We shall prove the \only if" direction, since the proof of the converse is very similar. Assume that ' is valid in NPL. Let be the set of primitive propositions (so that in particular, every primitive proposition that appears in ' is in ), and let 0 = f p j p 2 g. Let s and t be arbitrary truth assignments over 0 , and let S = (s; t). Take u 2 fs; tg. To show that ' + is valid in NPL, we must show that (S; u) j = ' + . Let s 0 ; t 0 be truth assignments over de ned by letting s 0 (p) = true i u(p) = true, and t 0 (p) = true i u( p) = false. Let We can use Corollary 6.6 to obtain an axiomatization of NPL. To prove that a propositional formula ' in L , ! is valid, we rst drive negations down until they apply only to primitive propositions, by applying the equivalences given by the next lemma.
Lemma 6.7: 1. ::' is logically equivalent to '. Note that NPL1{NPL3 correspond to Lemma 6.7. As we noted, they are useful in driving negations down.
Remark 6.8: PL can be replaced by the nonstandard version of any complete axiomatization of standard propositional logic for the language L 1 . That is, assume that standard modus ponens along with axioms S1, ..., Sk give a sound and complete axiomatization of standard propositional logic for the language L 1 . We can replace PL by S1 nst , ..., Sk nst , and get an equivalent axiomatization. This is because on the one hand, S1 nst , ..., Sk nst are special cases of PL, so the new axiomatization is no stronger. On the other hand, let ' 2 L 1 be a standard propositional tautology, so that ' nst is an an instance of PL. By completeness, there is a proof ' 1 ; : : :; ' m of ' using S1, ..., Sk and standard modus ponens, where ' m is ', and where each ' i is either an axiom (an instance of one of S1, ..., Sk) or the result of applying standard modus ponens to earlier formulas in the proof. We now show by induction on i that each ' nst i (and in particular, ' nst ) is provable from S1 nst , ..., Sk nst along with nonstandard modus ponens. This is immediate if ' i is an instance of one of S1, ..., Sk. Assume now that ' i is the result of applying standard modus ponens to earlier formulas ' j and ' j ) ' i in the proof. By induction assumption, ' nst j and (' j ) ' i ) nst (that is, ' nst j , ! ' nst i ) are provable from S1 nst , ..., Sk nst along with nonstandard modus ponens. By one more application of nonstandard modus ponens, it follows that ' i is similarly provable. Theorem 6.9: N is a sound and complete axiomatization for NPL.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The only inference rule in our axiom system N that we just asserted to be sound and complete is modus ponens. We now introduce a new propositional inference rule that we shall show is also sound. Of course, we do not need it for completeness (since it is not a rule of N). However, it will be useful in the next subsection, when we give a complete axiomatization for our nonstandard logic of knowledge. The new rule, which we call negation replacement, is:
From ' , ! false infer :'. Lemma 6.10: The negation replacement rule is sound for NPL.
Proof: Assume that ' , ! false is valid. Assume that S = (s; t) is an arbitrary NPL structure, and u 2 fs; tg. Then (S; u ) j = (' , ! false), since ' , ! false is valid. So (S; u ) 6 j = ', that is (S; u) j = :'. So :' is valid.
We remark that by a similar argument, the converse rule \from :' infer ' , ! false" is also sound. For both standard propositional logic and NPL, if logically implies , then \from infer " is a sound inference rule. As we noted earlier, the converse is true for standard propositional logic, but not for NPL in general. For example, even though the negation replacement rule \from ' , ! false infer :'" is sound, ' , ! false does not logically imply :' (since (S; u) j = (' , ! false) precisely if (S; u) 6 j = ', which is not the same as (S; u) j = :'). Nevertheless, it can shown that testing soundness of nonstandard inference rules has the same computational complexity as testing logical implication in NPL; they are both co-NP-complete FHV92].
A sound and complete axiomatization for the logic of knowledge
In this subsection, we give a sound and complete axiomatization for our nonstandard logic of knowledge. We also show that a natural modi cation (where the only propositional inference rule is modus ponens) does not provide a sound and complete axiomatization.
Finally, we show that the complexity of the validity problem is PSPACE-complete, just as for the standard case K.
The axiomatization that we shall show is sound and complete is obtained by modifying the axiom system K by (a) replacing propositional reasoning by nonstandard propositional reasoning, and (b) replacing standard implication ()) in the other axioms and rules by strong implication (, !). Thus, we obtain the axiom system, which we denote by K , ! , which consists of all instances (for the language L , ! ) of the axiom scheme and rules of inference given below:
NPR. All sound inference rules of NPL R1. From ' infer K i ' (Knowledge Generalization) Thus, one can say that in our approach agents are \nonstandardly" logically omniscient.
We shall actually show that the result of replacing NPR in K , ! by modus ponens and negation replacement, along with all sound axioms of NPL, is complete. It follows easily that NPR can be replaced by any complete axiomatization of NPL that includes modus ponens and negation replacement as inference rules.
In the rest of this section, when we say simply that a formula is provable, we mean We now prove the \only if" direction. Assume that V is a maximal consistent set.
Assume that neither ' nor (' , ! false) is in V . Since ' 6 2 V , it follows by maximality of V that there is a nite conjunction of certain members of V such that ^' is inconsistent, that is, (( ^') , ! false) is provable. Similarly, there is a nite conjunction 0 of certain members of V such that ( 0^( ' , ! false) , ! false) is provable. Now the formula (( ^') , ! false) , ! (( 0^( ' , ! false) , ! false) , ! (( ^ 0 ) , ! false)): (1) is an instance of NPR, since it is a substitution instance of (:(p^q) ) (:(p 0^: q) ) :(p^p 0 ))) nst : By (1) and two applications of modus ponens, we see that ^ 0 is inconsistent. This contradicts consistency of V .
Lemma 6.12: Let V be a maximal consistent set. is an instance of NPR. So V is inconsistent, a contradiction.
Assume now that '^ 2 V , but that ' 6 2 V or 6 2 V . Say for the sake of de niteness that ' 6 2 V . By Lemma 6.11, (' , ! false) 2 V . Now ((' , ! false)^('^ )) , ! false)) is an instance of NPR. That is, the set f'^ ; (' , ! false)g is inconsistent, so V is inconsistent, a contradiction.
We are now ready to state completeness of K , ! .
Theorem 6.13: K , ! is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to NM for formulas in the language L , ! . Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 6.14: We can, of course, replace NPR by those propositional axioms and rules that are actually used in the proof of Theorem 6.13 (including those used in the proofs of lemmas). The propositional rules that were used are modus ponens and negation replacement.
When we presented the axiom system K we remarked that PR can be replaced by any complete axiomatization of standard propositional logic that includes modus ponens as an inference rule. Surprisingly, this is not the case here, as the next theorem shows. Proof: Let A be the axiom system described in the statement of the theorem. Let be the formula (:K 1 true) , ! false. We leave to the reader the straightforward veri cation that is valid. However, we now show that is not provable in A. For the purposes of this proof only, we shall treat not only the primitive propositions, but also all formulas of the form K i , where 2 L , ! , as if they were primitive propositions.
Let us call this enlarged set of primitive propositions 0 . Similarly to the proof of Theorem 4.2, let s be the truth assignment where s(p) = true for every p 2 0 , and let t be the truth assignment where t(p) = false for every p 2 0 . Let S be the NPL structure (s; t), and let T be the set of all formulas ' such that (S; s) j = '. We now show of the validity problem for standard epistemic logic is a lower bound on the complexity of the validity problem in our nonstandard epistemic logic. The corresponding upper bound can be proved by well-known techniques Lad77]. Thus, the complexity of the validity problem is PSPACE-complete, just as for the standard case K.
Theorem 6.16: The validity problem for L , ! -formulas with respect to NM is PSPACEcomplete.
A Payo : Querying Knowledge Bases
As we have observed, logical omniscience still holds in the nonstandard approach, though in a weakened form. We also observed that the complexity of reasoning about knowledge has not improved. Thus, the gain from our nonstandard approach seems quite modest. We now show an additional nice payo for our approach: we show that in a certain important application we can obtain a polynomial-time algorithm for reasoning about knowledge.
The application is one we have alluded to earlier, where there is a ( nite) knowledge base of facts. Thus, the knowledge base can be viewed as a formula . A query to the knowledge base is another formula '. There are two ways to interpret such a query. First, we can ask whether ' is a consequence of . Second, we can ask whether knowledge of ' follows from knowledge of . Fortunately, these are equivalent questions, as we now see.
Proposition 7.1: Let ' 1 and ' 2 be L , ! -formulas. Then ' 1 logically implies ' 2 with respect to NM i K i ' 1 logically implies K i ' 2 with respect to NM. Proof: It is easy to see that if ' 1 logically implies ' 2 with respect to NM, then K i ' 1 logically implies K i ' 2 with respect to NM. We now show the converse.
Assume that ' 1 does not logically imply ' 2 with respect to NM. Let M = (S; ; K 1 ; : : : ; K n ; ) be a nonstandard structure and u a world of M such that (M; u) j = ' 1 and (M; u) 6 j = ' 2 . De ne a new nonstandard structure M 0 = (S 0 ; 0 ; K 0 1 ; : : : ; K 0 n ; y ) with one additional world t 6 2 S by letting (a) S 0 = S ftg, (b) 0 (s) = (s) for s 2 S, and 0 (t) be arbitrary, (c) K 0 j = K j for j 6 = i, and K 0 i = K i f(t; u)g, and (d) s y = s for s 2 S, and t y = t. It is straightforward to see that since (M; u) j = ' 1 and (M; u) 6 j = ' 2 , also (M 0 ; u) j = ' 1 and (M 0 ; u) 6 j = ' 2 . But then (M 0 ; t) j = K i ' 1 and (M 0 ; t) 6 j = K i ' 2 , and hence K i ' 1 does not logically imply K i ' 2 with respect to NM.
We focus here on the simple case where both the knowledge base and the query are standardly propositional (i.e., no , !). We know that in the standard approach determining whether logically implies ' is co-NP-complete. Is the problem of determining the consequences of a knowledge base in the nonstandard approach (i.e., determining whether logically implies ', or equivalently, by Proposition 7.1, whether K i logically implies K i ') any easier? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is negative (since if ' is false, then the problem is the same as deciding whether : is a tautology of NPL, which is co-NP-hard by Theorem 6.4.) There is, however, an interesting special case where using the nonstandard semantics does make the problem easier.
De ne a literal to be a primitive proposition p or its negation :p, and de ne a clause to be a disjunction of literals. For example, a typical clause is p_:q_r. We can consider a traditional database as being a collection of atomic facts, which can be thought of as primitive propositions. It is often an implicit assumption that if an atomic fact does not appear in a database, then its negation can be considered to be in the database (this assumption is called the closed world assumption Rei78]). We can imagine a database that explicitly contains not only atomic facts but also negations of atomic facts. This would correspond to a database of literals. More generally yet, we could consider a database (or knowledge base) of clauses, that is, disjunctions of literals. In fact, there are many applications in which the knowledge base consists of a nite collection of clauses. Thus, (which represents the knowledge base) is a conjunction of clauses. A formula (such as ) that is a conjunction of clauses is said to be in conjunctive normal form (or CNF).
Hence, we can think of the knowledge base as being a formula in CNF. What about the query '? Every standard propositional formula is equivalent to a formula in CNF (this is true even in our nonstandard semantics, because of Proposition 2.1). Thus, we will assume that the query ' has been transformed to CNF. (Note that we assumed that the knowledge base is given in CNF, while the query has to be transformed to CNF. The reason for this distinction is the fact that the transformation to CNF may involve an exponential blow-up. Consequently, while we might be reasonable to apply it to the query, it is not reasonable to apply it to the knowledge base, which is typically orders of magnitude larger than the query.) Let us now reconsider the query evaluation problem, where both the knowledge base and the query are in CNF. The next proposition tells us that under the standard semantics, the problem is no easier than the general problem of logical implication in propositional logic, that is, co-NP-complete. Proposition 7.2: The problem of deciding whether logically implies ' in standard propositional logic, for CNF formulas and ', is co-NP-complete.
Proof: Let be an arbitrary CNF formula, and let p be a primitive proposition that does not appear in . Now logically implies p in standard propositional logic i is unsatis able in standard propositional logic. This is because if ) p is valid, then so is ) :p, and hence ) (p^:p). This is su cient to prove the proposition, since the problem of determining nonsatis ability of a CNF formula is co-NP-complete.
By contrast, the problem is feasible under the nonstandard semantics. Before we show this, we need a little more machinery.
Let us say that clause 1 includes clause 2 It is clear that Theorem 7.3 gives us a polynomial-time decision procedure for deciding whether one CNF formula implies another in the nonstandard approach.
Theorem 7.4: There is a polynomial-time decision procedure for deciding whether logically implies ' in NPL (or K i logically implies K i ' with respect to NM), for CNF formulas and '. Theorems 7.3 and 7.4 yield an e cient algorithm for the evaluation of a CNF query with respect to a CNF knowledge base : answer \Yes" if logically implies in NPL. By Theorem 7.4, logical implication of CNF formulas in NPL can be checked in polynomial time, and Theorem 7.3 implies that any positive answer we obtain from testing logical implication between CNF fomulas in the nonstandard semantics will provide us with a correct positive answer for standard semantics as well. This means that even if we are ultimately interested only in conclusions that are derivable from standard reasoning, we can safely use the positive conclusions we obtain using nonstandard reasoning. Thus, the nonstandard approach yields a feasible query-answering algorithm for knowledge bases. Notice that the algorithm need not be correct with respect to negative answers. It is possible that does not logically imply in NPL even though logically implies with respect to standard propositional logic.
Theorem 7.4 was essentially proved in Lev84]. The precise relationship to Levesque's results will be clari ed in Section 9. Levesque's result (like Theorem 7.4) applies only to propositional formulas . Lakemeyer Lak87] extended it to modal formulas for the singleagent case. He de ned the class of extended-conjunctive-normal-form (ECNF) formulas and showed that Theorem 7.4 holds also for ECNF formulas Lak87]. Thus, his result shows that under the nonstandard semantics, there are nontrivial tractable fragments of the language that include modal formulas. Interestingly, a 4-valued semantics was also used in a di erent context in order to deal with computational complexity; PatelSchneider de ned a 4-valued terminological logic with tractable subsumption PS89].
8 Standard-World Validity Logical omniscience arises from considering knowledge as truth in all possible worlds. In the approach of this paper, we modify logical omniscience by changing the notion of truth. In this section, we consider the impossible-worlds approach, where we modify logical omniscience by changing the notion of possible world. The idea is to augment the possible worlds by impossible worlds, where the customary rules of logic do not hold. Even though these worlds are logically impossible, the agents nevertheless may consider them possible. Unlike our approach, where nonstandard worlds are considered just as realistic as standard worlds, under the impossible-worlds approach the impossible worlds are a gment of the agents' imagination; they serve only as epistemic alternatives.
Since agents consider the impossible worlds when computing their knowledge, logical omniscience need not hold. For example, suppose that an agent knows all formulas in , and logically implies '. Since the agent knows all formulas in , all formulas in must hold in all the worlds that the agent considers possible. However, even though logically implies ', it can happen that ' does not hold at one of the impossible worlds the agent considers possible, and so the agent may not know '. The key point here is that logical implication is determined by us, rational logicians for whom impossible worlds are indeed impossible. We do not consider impossible worlds when determining logical implication.
There are various impossible-worlds approaches (see, for example, Ran82] and Wan90]), depending on how we choose the possible and impossible worlds. In what follows, we shall take the possible worlds to be the standard worlds, and the impossible worlds to be the nonstandard worlds.
The di erence between our approach and the impossible-worlds approach is that in our approach the distinction between standard and nonstandard worlds does not play any role. In the impossible-worlds approach, however, the standard worlds (those where s = s ) have a special status. Intuitively, although an agent (who is not a perfect reasoner) might consider nonstandard worlds possible (where, for example, p^:p or K i p^:K i p holds), we as logicians do not consider such worlds possible; surely in the real world a formula is either true or false, but not both.
This distinction plays an important role in the way validity and logical implication are de ned. In the impossible-worlds approach we consider nonstandard worlds to be \impossible", and thus consider a formula ' to be valid if it is true at all of the \possible" worlds, that is, at all of the standard worlds. Formally, de ne a formula of L to be standard-world valid if it is true at every standard world of every nonstandard structure. The de nition for standard-world logical implication is analogous.
The reader may recall that, under the nonstandard semantics, ) behaves peculiarly. In particular, ) does not capture the notion of logical implication. In fact, that was one of the motivations to the introduction of strong implication. At standard worlds, however, ) and , ! coincide, that is, ' 1 ) ' 2 holds at a standard world precisely if ' 1 , ! ' 2 holds. It follows that even though ) does not capture logical implication, it does capture standard-world logical implication. The following analogue to Proposition 5.2 is immediate.
Proposition 8.1: Let ' 1 and ' 2 be formulas in L. Then ' 1 standard-world logically implies ' 2 i ' 1 ) ' 2 is standard-world valid.
The main feature of the impossible-worlds approach is the fact that knowledge is computed over all worlds, while logical implication is evaluated only over standard worlds. As a result we avoid logical omniscience. For example, an agent does not necessarily know valid formulas of standard propositional logic. Speci cally, although the classical tautology p _ :p is standard-world valid, an agent may not know this formula at a standard world s, since the agent might consider an incomplete world possible.
Let ' be a formula that contains precisely the primitive propositions p 1 ; : : : ; p k . De ne Complete(') to be the formula
Thus, Complete(') is true at a world s precisely if s is complete as far as all the primitive propositions in ' are concerned. In particular, if ' is propositional, and if Complete(') is true at s, then it follows by a simple induction on formulas that s is complete with respect to '. Let ' be a tautology of standard propositional logic. Clearly ' is true at every world s that is complete and coherent (with respect to all of the primitive propositions in '). The next proposition implies that if we assume only that s is complete, then this is still enough to guarantee that ' be true at s. Proposition 8.2: Let ' be a standard propositional formula. Then ' is a tautology of standard propositional logic i Complete(') logically implies ' in NPL.
Proof: Assume rst that Complete(') logically implies ' in NPL. To show that ' is a tautology of standard propositional logic, we need only show that ' is true at every world that is complete and coherent. But this is the case, since if s is complete, then by assumption ' is true at s. Proof: The proof is a fairly straightforward generalization of that of Proposition 8.2.
The details are omitted.
Ladner Lad77] showed that the PSPACE lower bound for validity in standard structures (Theorem 3.2) holds even when there is only one agent. If we replace E in Proposition 8.3 by K 1 , then it follows from Proposition 8.3 that there is a polynomial reduction of validity in standard structures with one agent to the logical implication problem for L-formulas in nonstandard structures with one agent. The PSPACE lower bound in Another form of logical omniscience that fails under the impossible-worlds approach is closure under implication: it is easy to see that the formula (K i '^K i (' ) )) ) K i is not standard-world valid. This lack of closure results from considering incoherent worlds possible: indeed, it is not hard to see that (K i '^K i (' ) )) ) K i ( _ ('^:')) is standard-world valid. That is, if an agent knows that ' holds and also knows that ' ) holds, then he knows that either holds or the world is incoherent. If the agent knows that the world is coherent, then his knowledge is closed under logical implication. We now formalize this observation. The next theorem says that knowledge of coherence implies that knowledge is closed under implication.
Theorem 8.5: Let ' and be standard propositional formulas. Then (K i (Coherent('))K i '^K i (' ) )) ) K i is standard-world valid. Proof: Denote K i (Coherent('))^K i '^K i (' ) ) by . By Proposition 8.1, it is su cient to show that standard-world logically implies K i . We shall show the stronger fact that logically implies K i with respect to NM. Let M = (S; ; K 1 ; : : : ; K n ; ) be a nonstandard structure, and s a world of M. Assume that is true at s and that (s; t) 2 K i , so Coherent(') is true at t. By a straightforward induction on formulas, we can show that for every propositional formula all of whose primitive propositions are contained in ', it is not the case that both and : are true at t. Now ' and ' ) are both true at t, since K i ' and K i (' ) ) are true at s. Since ' is true at t, it follows from what we just showed that :' is not true at t. Since ' ) is an abbreviation for :' _ , it follows that is true at t. Hence, K i is true at s. Theorems 8.4 and 8.5 explain why agents are not logically omniscient: \logically" is de ned here with respect to standard worlds, but the agents may consider nonstandard worlds possible. If an agent considers only standard worlds possible, so that we have the antecedents K i (Complete(')) and K i (Coherent(')) of Theorems 8.4 and 8.5, then this agent is logically omniscient (more accurately, he knows every tautology of standard propositional logic and his knowledge is closed under implication).
We conclude the discussion of the impossible-world approach by reconsidering the knowledge base situation discussed earlier, where the knowledge base is described by a formula and the query is described by a formula '. We saw earlier (Proposition 7.1) that in the nonstandard approach, ' is a consequence of precisely when knowledge of ' is a consequence of knowledge of .
The situation is di erent under the impossible-worlds approach. On one hand, implication of knowledge coincides in both approaches. Proposition 8.6: Let ' 1 and ' 2 be L , ! -formulas. Then K i ' 1 standard-world logically implies K i ' 2 i K i ' 1 logically implies K i ' 2 in nonstandard structures.
Proof: The proof, which is very similar to that of Proposition 7.1, is left to the reader.
On the other hand, the two interpretations of query evaluation di er in the impossibleworlds approach. In contrast to Proposition 7.1, it is possible to nd ' 1 and ' 2 in L such that ' 1 standard-world logically implies ' 2 , but K i ' 1 does not standard-world logically imply K i ' 2 (let ' 1 be p^:p, and let ' 2 be q). The reason for this failure is that ' 1 standard-world logically implying ' 2 deals with logical implication in standard worlds, whereas K i ' 1 standard-world logically implying K i ' 2 deals with logical implication in worlds agents consider possible, which includes nonstandard worlds.
The di erence between the two interpretations of query evaluation in the standard approach can have a signi cant computational impact. Consider the situation where both and ' are CNF propositional formulas. Theorem 7.4 and Proposition 8.6 tell us that testing whether K i standard-world logically implies K i ' can be done in polynomial time. However, in this case, testing whether standard-world logically implies ' is co-NP-complete, according to Proposition 7.2.
Levesque and Lakemeyer's formalism
In this section, we relate our results to those of Levesque Lev84] and Lakemeyer Lak87]. First, we relate our syntax and semantics to theirs.
Levesque and Lakemeyer also attempt to decouple the semantics of a formula from that of its negation, but their approach is di erent from ours. We brie y discuss the details, and then present their formal sematics.
De ne a nonstandard truth assignment to be a function that assigns to each literal a truth value. (Recall that a literal is either a primitive proposition p or its negation :p). Thus, although an ordinary truth assignment assigns a truth value to each primitive proposition p, a nonstandard truth assignment assigns a truth value to both p and :p, for each primitive proposition p. Under a given nonstandard truth assignment, it is possible that both p and :p can be assigned the value true, or that both can be assigned false, or that one can be assigned true and the other false. This decouples the semantics of p and :p. As we shall show below, it is quite straightforward to decouple the semantics of a conjunction from its negation, once we have already done so for each of its conjuncts. i . We also remark that Levesque and Lakemeyer have two di erent avors of knowledge in their papers: explicit knowledge and implicit knowledge. (Actually, they talk about belief rather than knowledge, but the distinction is irrelevant to our discussion here.) We consider here only their notion of explicit knowledge, since this is the type that avoids logical omniscience.
Although, super cially, our semantics seems quite di erent from the Levesque-Lakemeyer semantics, it is straightforward to show that in fact, the two approaches are equivalent in the sense of the following proposition. 
It is easy to show by induction on the structure of ' that for every world s, Remark 9.2: We note that there is an equivalent semantics to that of Levesque and Lakemeyer that avoids the use of two satisfaction relations j = T and j = F . That is, we can de ne a notion j = 0 of satisfaction directly such that if M is an LL structure, s is a world of M, and ' is an L formula, then (M; s) j = ' i (M; s) j = 0 '. Rather than de ning :' to be true i ' is not true (as we do with standard structures), and rather than giving a uniform de nition of when :' is true (as we do with nonstandard structures, using ), we instead de ne separately what it means for ' to be true and what it means for :' to be true, for each type of formula ' (that is, for primitive propositions, and formulas of the form ' 1^'2 , :', and K i '). This way we can make the truth of ' and :' independent. The de nition is as follows (where we write j = for j = 0 , for readability): Levesque and Lakemeyer use standard-world validity as their notion of validity. Thus, their notion of logical implication is standard-world logical implication, so as in Proposition 8.1, ) can be used to express logical implication in the language. Therefore, unlike us, they do not enlarge their language to include , !. They obtain a completeness result (with some restrictions on the allowable formulas). Because they use standardworld validity, their axiomatization contains all standard tautologies. However (as is the point with impossible-worlds approaches), agents need not know all standard tautologies.
Thus, for example, p ) p is valid for them, since they are considering standard world validity, but K i (p ) p) is not, since agent i may consider a nonstandard world possible where p ) p does not hold. Levesque Lev84] proves that there is a polynomial-time decision procedure for deciding whether K i logically implies K i ', for CNF formulas and ' (this is the decision procedure described in Theorem 7.3). The existence of this polynomial-time decision procedure is analogous to part of Theorem 7.4. The other part of Theorem 7.4 (that there is a polynomial-time decision procedure for deciding whether logically implies ', for CNF formulas and ') is false in Levesque's context, since he is considering standard-world logical implication. In particular, the analogue of Proposition 7.1 does not hold for him. We originally obtained Theorem 7.4 by using Levesque's result, along with Proposition 8.6 (and Proposition 7.1).
Conclusions
We have investigated a new approach to dealing with the well-known logical omniscience problem in epistemic logics. The idea is to base the epistemic logic on a nonstandard logic, in the hope that by taking an appropriate nonstandard logic, we can lessen the logical omniscience problem.
The nonstandard propositional logic we use is NPL, which we introduce in this paper. NPL has a number of attractive features, including a clean semantics and an elegant complete axiomatization. In addition, there is a tractable (polynomial-time) decision procedure for evaluating a natural class of knowledge base queries. Thus, there is a sense in which the logical omniscience problem is not as acute when considering an epistemic logic based on NPL. Our approach is closely related to that of Levesque and Lakemeyer. Indeed, we feel that thinking in terms of NPL sheds new light on their results.
There is, of course, nothing special about the role of NPL in our approach. We could just as well considered epistemic logics based on other nonstandard logics. Perhaps by considering other logics we can obtain other desirable properties. We leave consideration of this point to future research. ' j+1 is obtained from ' j by driving down a negation that is as high in the parse tree as possible, for j = 1; : : : ; k ? 1. Now each ' j+1 is obtained from ' j by replacing a formula by a (provably) equivalent formula. Since ' 1 = ' is valid, it is easy to see that each ' j is valid. Our goal is to show that each ' j is provable in our axiom system N, so that in particular, ' 1 (that is, ') is provable. Since ' k is pseudo-positive, it is fairly straightforward to use Corollary 6.6 to show that ' k is provable (we give the demonstration below). We would then like to conclude the proof by showing that if ' j+1 is provable, then so is ' j , since after all, the only di erence between ' j and ' j+1 is that some subformula of ' j is replaced by a provably equivalent formula 0 to obtain ' j+1 . It then follows easily (as shown below) that we would be done if we showed that the formula ( * ) 0 ) , ! (' j+1 , ! ' j ) (9) were provable. We shall show below that in fact, (9) is an instance of PL. This is not obvious, since there may be negations in (9).
We now give the details of the proof. We show by backwards induction on j (for j = k; k ?1; : : : ; 1) that each ' j is provable. As we observed above, each ' j is valid, so in particular, ' k is valid. Since ' k is also pseudo-positive, it follows from Corollary 6.6 that ((' k ) + ) st is a standard propositional tautology. So (((' k ) + ) st ) nst is an instance of axiom scheme PL. By Lemma 6.1, (((' k ) + ) st ) nst = (' k ) + . Thus, (' k ) + is an instance of axiom scheme PL. A substitution instance of (' k ) + , and hence an instance of PL, is obtained by replacing every occurrence of p by :p (where p is the new primitive proposition that replaces every occurrence :p in ' when we form (' k ) + from ' k ). Therefore, ' k is simply an instance of PL, and so is of course provable. This takes care of the base case j = k of the induction.
Assume inductively that ' j+1 is provable. Now ' j+1 is obtained from ' j by replacing some (negated) subformula of ' j by another formula 0 . Let p and p 0 be new primitive propositions. Let (resp. 0 ) be the result of replacing this occurrence of (resp. 0 ) in ' j (resp. ' j+1 ) by p (resp. p 0 ). So and 0 are identical, except that the unique occurrence of p in is replaced by p 0 in 0 . If a negation appears in (and hence in 0 ), then let be a negated subformula of that appears as high as possible in the parse tree of . Since is a negated subformula of ' j that appears as high as possible in the parse tree of ' j , it is not hard to see that p is not a subformula of . Hence is a subformula of ' j+1 . Replace in (resp. 0 ) by a new primitive proposition p .
Continue this process until all negations are replaced. Call the nal result (resp. 0 ). Note that and 0 are negation-free, and are identical, except that the unique occurrence of p in is replaced by p 0 in 0 . The formula (p * ) p 0 ) , ! ( 0 , ! ) is an instance of PL. By construction, ' j (resp. ' j+1 ) is a substitution instance of (resp. 0 ). Hence, the formula (9) above is an instance of PL. Now ( * ) 0 ) is an instance of one of the axiom schemes NPL1, NPL2, or NPL3, and so is provable. i.e., the worlds in M c contains as elements precisely the formulas that they satisfy. Since it is easy to show that every consistent formula in L , ! belongs to some maximally consistent set, this is su cient to prove ( ).
Given a maximal consistent set V of formulas, de ne V = f' 2 L , ! j :' 6 2 V g. We now show that V is a maximal consistent set, and that V = V . is provable. By Lemma 6.12(1), this formula is in V . Since ' 1 ; : : :; ' k are all in V=K i , it follows that K i ' 1 ; : : : ; K i ' k are all in V . By repeated applications of the distribution axiom and by Lemma 6.12(1) and Lemma 6.12(2), it is easy to see that K i 2 V , as desired.
